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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
MANSMANN, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal arises out of a judgment of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting the 
Government's motion for summary judgment and denying 
the Taxpayers' cross-motion for summary judgment in their 
action seeking a refund of tax penalties. The Taxpayers 
contended before the District Court, as well as on appeal, 
that reasonable cause existed for the late payment and 
deposit of employment taxes under 26 U.S.C. #8E8E # 6651(a)(2) 
and 6656(a), respectively and, therefore, they are entitled to 
an abatement of the penalties assessed under those 
provisions. The District Court, relying on the bright line test 
set forth in Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589 (6th 
Cir. 1994), that financial difficulties alone can never 
constitute reasonable cause for abatement of a penalty 
assessed pursuant to sections 6651 and 6656 of the 
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Internal Revenue Code, concluded that reasonable cause 
was not established by the Taxpayers because financial 
distress was the only fact and circumstance supporting 
their failure to pay and deposit employment taxes timely. 
 
Because we believe the Brewery bright line test is 
inconsistent with both Congress' creation of a reasonable 
cause exception and Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1), we find 
that the District Court erred as a matter of law in adopting 
the bright line rule in Brewery. We believe the better 
reasoned approach is the one set forth in Fran Corp. v. 
United States, 164 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1999), which requires 
us to examine all the facts and circumstances of the 
Taxpayers' financial situation. After reviewing all of the 
facts and circumstances, we have concluded that 
reasonable cause existed for the Taxpayers' failure to pay 
and deposit their employment taxes timely. Thus, we will 
reverse the judgment of the District Court and enter 
judgment for the Taxpayers. 
 
I. 
 
The following facts are undisputed and have been largely 
stipulated to by the parties. East Wind Industries, Inc. 
("East Wind") and Delaware East Wind, Inc. ("Delaware East 
Wind") (collectively referred to as the "Taxpayers") were 
incorporated under the laws of Delaware in 1966. At all 
relevant times, East Wind manufactured military clothing 
and goods for sale to the United States Department of 
Defense ("USDOD"). From 1982 through 1986, Delaware 
East Wind operated as a holding company that owned the 
manufacturing plant of East Wind. Consequently, East 
Wind paid rents to Delaware East Wind for the 
manufacturing plant. Delaware East Wind began to bid on 
government contracts when East Wind ceased operations in 
1986. All business activities of the Taxpayers were 
controlled by Mario D'Antonio, Vice-President of East Wind. 
 
The Taxpayers manufactured the military clothing and 
goods for purchase by the federal government through its 
Defense Personnel Support Center ("DPSC"), and the 
Defense Contract Administration Services ("DCAS") agency 
administered the contracts.1 Both DPSC and DCAS are 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The DPSC is the Defense Department supply center located in 
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, responsible for the purchase and 
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branches of the Defense Logistics Agency ("DLA") 
(collectively referred to as the "Defense Agencies"). All of the 
Taxpayers' contracts went through these Defense Agencies. 
Any other defense departments for whom the Taxpayers 
could have manufactured goods were administratively 
handled by DCAS. 
 
From 1966 through 1981, East Wind had a 15-year 
history of obtaining and completing government contracts. 
During that same period, the Taxpayers had a history of 
timely filing payroll tax returns and paying their 
withholding taxes. Beginning with the tax period ending 
June 30, 1982, through the tax period ending December 
31, 1986, (the "periods in question"), East Wind timely filed 
all of the appropriate tax returns but failed to pay its 
employment withholding taxes when such taxes became 
due and owing. Beginning with the tax period ending 
December 31, 1986, through the tax period ending June 
30, 1988, (the "periods in question"), Delaware East Wind 
timely filed all of the appropriate tax returns but failed to 
pay its employment withholding taxes when such taxes 
became due and owing. The Taxpayers ultimately paid their 
delinquent employment taxes in full and certain penalties 
owing to the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service") 
pursuant to a reorganization plan approved by the 
Bankruptcy Court.2 
 
As early as 1976, certain employees at the Defense 
Agencies began soliciting illegal bribes from the Taxpayers. 
Initially, these bribes were in the nature of certain favors to 
be provided by the Taxpayers, such as assisting an 
employee of the Defense Agencies in obtaining a mortgage 
or in gaining admittance to a certain school for a son or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
distribution of food, clothing and medical supplies for the armed forces 
of the United States. The DCAS is responsible for contract management, 
quality assurance and financial management of contracts awarded by 
USDOD supply centers, such as DPSC. As part of its responsibilities, 
DCAS oversees the performance of contracts to assure compliance with 
contract terms and USDOD regulations through a network of regional 
offices and management areas. 
 
2. The parties disagree as to the exact amount of the penalties paid by 
the Taxpayers. This issue is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal. 
 
                                4 
  
daughter. Eventually, the bribes being solicited took the 
form of monetary compensation. The amount demanded by 
these corrupt employees amounted to 50% of the 
Taxpayers' business. When the Taxpayers declined to pay 
the bribes, they did not receive new contracts from the 
Defense Agencies unless they were the only bidder on a 
particular contract. As a result of refusing to pay the illegal 
bribes to the corrupt employees of the Defense Agencies 
during the periods in question, (1) the Taxpayers were not 
paid monies due and owing to them for work which was 
successfully performed and for goods delivered to and 
accepted by the Defense Agencies; (2) payments were 
intentionally and substantially delayed; (3) inventory was 
wrongfully rejected and (4) orders were required to be 
reworked according to the "trumped up" false specifications 
of the government inspectors. The Defense Agencies did, 
however, make some contract payments to the Taxpayers 
after they refused to pay the bribes. Moreover, the 
Taxpayers were awarded some additional contracts by the 
Defense Agencies during this time period, but only when 
the other companies who were paying off the corrupt 
employees had not bid on the contract. 
 
The Taxpayers attempted to put a stop to the bribery 
activities of the Defense Agencies' employees by contacting 
the DPSC legal staff in August, 1984, the Commanding 
Officer, DCASMA -- Philadelphia, in August, 1983, Quality 
Assurance -- DCASR, and their Congressman. The 
Taxpayers expected that in doing so, they would mitigate 
the negative economic effect on their business. 
Unfortunately, the Taxpayers' expectations were unrealistic. 
 
East Wind's Vice-President Mario D'Antonio consulted 
with several professionals regarding financial and legal 
concerns in light of the bribery and cash flow problems. In 
particular, he consulted with accountants regarding such 
matters as cash flow, payables, cash conservation, payroll, 
personal loans and payment of taxes. He also consulted 
with attorneys regarding such legal matters as the 
collection of receivables, forwarding claims against the 
government, analyzing legal strategies to maintain the 
company, debtor's rights, and legal responsibility for taxes. 
D'Antonio also consulted with other manufacturers to learn 
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how they responded to the bribery demands in order to 
determine how to proceed with the Taxpayers' business 
given the illegal action of the employees of the Defense 
Agencies. Moreover, D'Antonio and his wife took out 
numerous personal loans, including a mortgage on their 
personal residence, to provide additional cash to pay 
essential employees, those creditors who were threatening 
to cut off their services, or to pay some of the payroll taxes. 
 
As a consequence of the Defense Agencies' actions in 
response to the refusal to pay the illegal bribes, the 
Taxpayers sustained monetary damages in an amount in 
excess of $5.1 million. Subsequently, the Taxpayers 
asserted claims against the Defense Agencies to recoup 
their damages.3 In addition, the Taxpayers brought tort 
claims against the Defense Agencies. 
 
In 1984, East Wind and Delaware East Wind filed 
separately for protection under Chapter 11 of the 
Bankruptcy Code. During the periods in question, Delaware 
East Wind timely filed its payroll tax returns but continued 
to accrue employment tax liabilities until it ceased 
operations in 1988. The claims register in the Bankruptcy 
Court substantiates that the Taxpayers had not been 
paying amounts owed to their suppliers and other creditors 
during the periods in question. 
 
The certified public accountant ("CPA") appointed by the 
Bankruptcy Court noted that the cash flow of a company 
such as the Taxpayers' is essentially within the inventory. 
Inventories in the amount of $750,000, which had been 
wrongfully rejected by the Defense Agencies, remained in 
the Taxpayers' warehouse.4 The CPA found that the 
Taxpayers' employees were compensated on an hourly basis 
at little more than the minimum wage and, without that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Claims made by the Taxpayers against the Defense Agencies included 
matters brought before the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals 
("ASBCA"). One such dispute arose between the parties with regard to an 
unexecuted written settlement agreement concerning the claim, which 
agreement was enforced against the Government by the Bankruptcy 
Court. 
 
4. The inventory was eventually reworked by the Taxpayers for which 
they received payment. 
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pay, would have left the Taxpayers' employ. In the CPA's 
opinion, the Taxpayers would have had to shut down 
operations without these employees. Nonetheless, between 
1982 and 1988, D'Antonio had to lay off a substantial 
number of employees because the Taxpayers were not being 
awarded any new contracts. The reduction in employees 
was reflected in the payroll tax returns for the successive 
periods. 
 
Late in 1984, D'Antonio was approached by the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") and was asked to cooperate 
in an investigation of the corrupt employees of the Defense 
Agencies. D'Antonio went undercover for the FBI in 1985 in 
order to gather information on the Defense Agencies' 
employees involved in the bribery scheme and worked with 
the FBI for a period of two years. During this time, the FBI 
instructed the Taxpayers when to pay and when not to pay 
bribes to top-ranking employees of the Defense Agencies. 
Moreover, D'Antonio withdrew the Taxpayers from 
competitive bidding on DPSC procurements which were 
tainted by corrupt DPSC contractors and their consultants 
in order to expose this criminal misconduct. D'Antonio's 
cooperation with the FBI far exceeded the Initial 
Memorandum of Understanding as to his participation in 
the undercover investigation. For his part in the illegal 
procurement activities, D'Antonio pled guilty to two counts 
of violating the False Claims Act, 18 U.S.C. S 287. He paid 
$2,000 in fines but was not sentenced to a period of 
incarceration. 
 
A global settlement agreement was reached between the 
Taxpayers and the Defense Agencies as a result of the 
Bankruptcy Court's enforcement of the Taxpayers' claims 
against the Defense Agencies. The Taxpayers received a 
total of $2.1 million from the Defense Agencies, $1.3 million 
of which was paid to East Wind and $800,000 of which was 
paid to Delaware East Wind. Out of this settlement, which 
was administered by the Bankruptcy Court, the Taxpayers 
paid all of the outstanding employment taxes, as well as 
penalties and interest, to the IRS. 
 
Thereafter, the Taxpayers commenced this suit in the 
District Court seeking a refund of the penalties assessed 
and paid on the delinquent employment taxes. The 
 
                                7 
  
Taxpayers alleged they were entitled to an abatement of the 
penalty because the delinquency was due to reasonable 
cause and not due to willful neglect. The matter was 
submitted to the District Court on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. On January 15, 1999, the District 
Court granted summary judgment in the Government's 
favor and dismissed the Taxpayers' summary judgment 
motion as moot. See East Wind Industries, Inc. v. United 
States, 33 F.Supp.2d 339 (D. N.J. 1999). 
 
The Taxpayers filed this timely appeal. We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. 
 
II. 
 
The issue before us is whether the District Court erred in 
applying the bright line test set forth in Brewery, Inc. v. 
United States, 33 F.3d 589, 592 (6th Cir. 1994), that 
financial difficulties per se can never constitute reasonable 
cause for abatement of a penalty assessed pursuant to 
sections 6651 and 6656 of the Internal Revenue Code, in 
light of the pertinent statutory language and Treasury 
Regulations thereunder. If we determine that the District 
Court erred in applying the Brewery standard, then we 
must also consider whether, based upon all the facts and 
circumstances, the Taxpayers' failure to pay their 
employment taxes timely was due to reasonable cause and 
not willful neglect pursuant to sections 6651 and 6656 of 
the Internal Revenue Code and the Treasury Regulations 
thereunder. 
 
We exercise de novo review over the District Court's order 
granting the Government's motion for summary judgment. 
Greenberg v. United States, 46 F.3d 239, 242 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(citing United States v. Carrigan, 31 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 
1994)). De novo review requires us to apply the same test 
used by the District Court, "namely, whether there is `no 
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.' " Tolchin 
v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 
1099, 1106 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)) 
(other citation omitted). Thus, we must review all of the 
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the 
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Taxpayers in order to determine whether there is a genuine 
issue of material fact. Greenberg, 46 F.3d at 242. If we find 
that no genuine issue of material fact remains, then we 
must determine whether the Government is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. Id. 
 
A determination of the elements required to prove that 
failure to pay employment taxes was due to reasonable 
cause is a question of law subject to plenary review. United 
States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 249 n. 8 (1985) (citations 
omitted). Whether the required elements are present in a 
particular case is a question of fact which we review for 
clear error. Id. 
 
A. 
 
Under sections 6651(a)(1), (a)(2) and 6656(a) of the 
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the "Code" or 
"IRC"), the Service imposes mandatory penalties for the 
failure to file returns, pay taxes, or deposit employment 
taxes in a government depository unless the taxpayer can 
show that such failure was due to "reasonable cause" and 
not due to "willful neglect." Thus, to succeed in obtaining 
an abatement of penalties imposed under sections 6651 
and 6656, the taxpayer bears the heavy burden of 
establishing that (1) the failure did not result from "willful 
neglect," and (2) the failure was "due to reasonable cause." 
United States v. Boyle, 469 U.S. 241, 245 (1985) (citing IRC 
S 6651(a)(1)). Neither "willful neglect" nor "reasonable 
cause" is defined in the Code. 
 
A definition of "willful neglect" was provided by the 
Supreme Court in Boyle, which found that the phrase 
"willful neglect," as used in section 6651(a)(1), had been 
construed over the years to mean "a conscious, intentional 
failure or reckless indifference."5  Id. (citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Court's analysis in Boyle addressed penalties for failure to file 
tax 
returns under section 6651(a)(1). The language concerning the standard 
for failure to file a return is identical to the language in sections 
6651(a)(2) and 6656 for failure to pay and to deposit. We see no reason 
why the Court's analysis under section 6651(a)(1) should not guide our 
analysis of sections 6651(a)(2) and 6656. 
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Stated another way, the taxpayer must show that the 
failure to file a return timely was the result"neither of 
carelessness, reckless indifference, nor intentional failure." 
Id. at 246 n. 4. 
 
The Treasury Regulations provide an explanation of the 
other required element, "reasonable cause": 
 
       If the taxpayer exercised ordinary business care and 
       prudence and was nevertheless unable to file the 
       return within the prescribed time, then the delay is due 
       to a reasonable cause. A failure to pay will be 
       considered to be due to reasonable cause to the extent 
       that the taxpayer has made a satisfactory showing that 
       he exercised ordinary business care and prudence in 
       providing for payment of his tax liability and was 
       nevertheless either unable to pay the tax or would 
       suffer an undue hardship (as described in S 1.6161-1(b) 
       of this chapter) if he paid on the due date. In 
       determining whether the taxpayer was unable to pay 
       the tax in spite of the exercise of ordinary business care 
       and prudence in providing for payment of his tax 
       liability, consideration will be given to all the facts and 
       circumstances of the taxpayer's financial situation, 
       including the amount and nature of the taxpayer's 
       expenditures in light of the income (or other amounts) 
       he could, at the time of such expenditures, reasonably 
       expect to receive prior to the date prescribed for the 
       payment of the tax. Thus, for example, a taxpayer who 
       incurs lavish or extravagant living expenses in an 
       amount such that the remainder of his assets and 
       anticipated income will be insufficient to pay his tax, 
       has not exercised ordinary business care and prudence 
       in providing for the payment of his tax liability. 
       Further, a taxpayer who invests funds in speculative or 
       illiquid assets has not exercised ordinary business care 
       and prudence in providing for the payment of his tax 
       liability unless, at the time of the investment, the 
       remainder of the taxpayer's assets and estimated 
       income will be sufficient to pay his tax or it can be 
       reasonably foreseen that the speculative or illiquid 
       investment made by the taxpayer can be utilized (by 
       sale or as security for a loan) to realize sufficient funds 
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       to satisfy the tax liability. A taxpayer will be considered 
       to have exercised ordinary business care and prudence 
       if he made reasonable efforts to conserve sufficient 
       assets in marketable form to satisfy his tax liability 
       and nevertheless was unable to pay all or a portion of 
       the tax when it became due. 
 
Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1) (emphasis added). The term 
"undue hardship," for purposes of determining whether 
"reasonable cause" has been established, has been defined 
as follows: 
 
       The term "undue hardship" means more than an 
       inconvenience to the taxpayer. It must appear that 
       substantial financial loss, for example, loss due to the 
       sale of property at a sacrifice price, will result to the 
       taxpayer for making payment on the due date of the 
       amount with respect to which the extension is desired. 
       If a market exists, the sale of property at the current 
       market price is not ordinarily considered as resulting 
       in an undue hardship. 
 
Treas. Reg. S 1.6161-1(b). 
 
Moreover, in determining whether a taxpayer has 
exercised "ordinary business care and prudence" in 
providing for the payment of its tax liability, courts must 
consider the nature of the delinquent tax. The regulations 
specifically provide that: 
 
       In determining if the taxpayer exercised ordinary 
       business care and prudence in providing for the 
       payment of his tax liability, consideration will be given 
       to the nature of the tax which the taxpayer has failed 
       to pay. Thus, for example, facts and circumstances 
       which, because of the taxpayer's efforts to conserve 
       assets in marketable form, may constitute reasonable 
       cause for nonpayment of income taxes may not 
       constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay over 
       taxes described in section 7501 that are collected or 
       withheld from any other person. 
 
Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(2). 
 
The taxes that the Taxpayers failed to pay to the IRS 
timely were section 7501 taxes. Under IRC S 7501, 
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employers are required to collect or withhold the employee's 
portion of employment taxes as salaries are disbursed. 
These taxes are commonly referred to as "trust fund taxes" 
because the amounts withheld from employees' wages or 
salaries for employment taxes are to be held in a special 
fund in trust for the United States. 
 
The parties disagree as to the appropriate legal standard 
to be applied to determine reasonable cause, as well as to 
the application of that standard to the facts and 
circumstances here. The Taxpayers maintain that their 
failure to pay taxes and make deposits on time was due to 
the fraudulent criminal activities of top officials at the 
Defense Agencies which so permeated the DLA that despite 
their ordinary business care and prudence, they were 
disabled and could not pay the payroll taxes when due 
without suffering undue hardship. The Taxpayers challenge 
the District Court's refusal to consider any financial 
difficulties in determining whether reasonable cause had 
been established. In support of their argument, the 
Taxpayers rely primarily on Fran Corp. v. United States, 164 
F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1999), as well as a number of district 
court and bankruptcy court decisions.6  
 
On the other hand, the Government contends that the 
Taxpayers' failure to pay their employment taxes timely was 
due to willful neglect because they chose to pay other 
creditors and employees instead of the IRS. The 
Government further argues that the Taxpayers failed to 
establish reasonable cause. Relying on the Sixth Circuit's 
decision in Brewery, Inc. v. United States, 33 F.3d 589 (6th 
Cir. 1994), the Government takes the position thatfinancial 
distress alone does not establish reasonable cause. Relying 
on the language in the Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(2), the 
Government maintains that when trust fund taxes are at 
issue, a more stringent standard is applied. The 
Government contends that the need for operating capital 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. See Glenwal-Schmidt v. United States, 78-2 U.S.T.C. P 9610 (D. D.C. 
1978); In re Arthurs Industrial Maintenance, Inc., 92-1 U.S.T.C. P 50242 
(Bankr. W.D. Va. 1992), aff'd, 93-1 U.S.T.C. P 50092 (1993); In re Pool 
and Varga, Inc., 60 B.R. 722 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986); and In re Slater, 
190 B.R. 695 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1995). 
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necessary to prevent insolvency is not reasonable cause for 
failing to pay over the trust fund taxes at issue. The 
Government submits that because financial distress was 
the only fact and circumstance supporting the Taxpayers' 
failure to pay trust fund taxes timely, Brewery is 
dispositive. Thus, the Government concludes that the 
Taxpayers have failed to establish reasonable cause under 
the test set forth in Brewery.7  
 
The District Court applied the bright line test set forth in 
Brewery, which provided that "financial difficulties can 
never constitute reasonable cause to excuse the penalties 
for nonpayment of withholding taxes by an employer." 33 
F.3d at 592. Our sister court of appeals in Brewery based 
its adoption of the bright line standard upon both the trust 
language of section 7501 and Treas. Reg. S 301.6651- 
1(c)(2), which provides that circumstances which, because 
of the taxpayer's efforts to conserve marketable assets, may 
constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay income taxes, 
may not constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay trust 
fund taxes. The Brewery court, agreeing with the District 
Court there, held that since the trust fund taxes were for 
the government's exclusive use, the taxpayer's use of the 
trust funds for the payment of other creditors could not, as 
a matter of law, constitute reasonable cause for abating the 
penalties assessed under sections 6651 and 6656. Id. In so 
holding, the Brewery court found persuasive the reasoning 
of its court in an earlier decision, Collins v. United States, 
in which it opined that: 
 
       It is no excuse that, as a matter of sound business 
       judgment, the money was paid to suppliers and for 
       wages in order to keep the corporation operating as a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The Government further maintains that even if the District Court had 
followed the test applied in Fran Corp. v. United States, supra, the 
result 
would have been the same. In support of its position, the Government 
proffers the Taxpayers' six year history with the corrupt government 
officials, that the Defense Agencies would refuse to pay on the contracts 
and unjustifiably reject the goods was foreseeable, and the Taxpayers 
were not without fault. Thus, the Government alleges that the Taxpayers' 
course of conduct did not constitute ordinary business care and 
prudence. 
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       going concern -- the government cannot be made an 
       unwilling partner in a floundering business. 
 
Brewery, 33 F.3d at 593 (quoting Collins v. United States, 
848 F.2d 740, 741-42 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal citation 
omitted). 
 
In the case before us, the District Court also found this 
reasoning persuasive in imposing a more stringent 
standard for abating penalties assessed for non-payment of 
trust fund taxes. What the District Court failed to consider, 
however, is that here the Government was not an unwilling 
partner in a floundering business but, indeed, an active 
participant. 
 
The Brewery court's decision is troubling on a number of 
grounds. First, the application of such a bright line rule 
when a tax payment is delayed due to financial difficulties 
is inconsistent with Congress' creation of a "reasonable 
cause" exception, as well as the Treasury Regulations 
which set forth the factual circumstances that must be 
alleged to establish reasonable cause. Fran Corp., 164 F.3d 
at 818. Neither the penalty provisions of the Code nor the 
Treasury Regulations supports the bright line rule. 
 
The Code does not bar consideration of financial 
difficulties in determining whether reasonable cause has 
been established, and it does not differentiate between trust 
fund taxes and nontrust fund taxes. Id. In this regard, the 
Second Circuit noted in Fran: 
 
       This is particularly significant with respect to Section 
       6656, which specifically addresses the failure to 
       deposit employment taxes yet requires neither a higher 
       standard in such cases nor that courts turn a blind 
       eye to a taxpayer's financial circumstances. The 
       "reasonable cause"/"wilful neglect" standard has been 
       part of the penalty provisions of the tax statutes since 
       1916, and Congress has not amended these provisions 
       to create a different standard for the failure to pay 
       trust fund taxes. 
 
Id. (citing Boyle, 469 U.S. at 245 n.3). 
 
Moreover, Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1) specifically 
directs courts to examine "all the facts and circumstances 
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of the taxpayer's financial situation." Similarly, under 
Treas. Reg. S 1.6161-1(b), we are required to determine 
whether the taxpayer would have suffered "undue 
hardship," i.e., "substantial financial loss," from the 
payment of taxes. As noted by the court in Fran, neither of 
these portions of the Treasury Regulations has changed 
since at least 1973, and with regard to Treas. Reg. 
S 1.6161-1, since 1960. 164 F.3d at 818. Where regulations 
have continued over a long period of time without 
substantial change and have applied to unamended or 
substantially reenacted statutes, they are deemed to have 
received the approval of Congress and thus have the effect 
of law. Id. (citation omitted). Thus, the court of appeals in 
Fran concluded that "[t]hese regulations clearly require a 
factual assessment of the taxpayer's financial situation to 
determine whether it has exercised ordinary business care 
and prudence in responding to competing financial 
obligations." Id. at 819. 
 
The Fran court also found fault with the Brewery court's 
reliance on Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(2) for support of a 
bright line rule. The Fran court found that the regulation 
simply provides that the court: 
 
       consider, among other factors in [its] analysis of the 
       taxpayer's care and prudence, "the nature of the tax 
       which the taxpayer has failed to pay," and provides an 
       illustrative example to suggest that "facts and 
       circumstances which . . . may constitute reasonable 
       cause for nonpayment of income taxes may not 
       constitute reasonable cause for failure to pay over 
       taxes described in section 7501 that are collected or 
       withheld from any other person." 
 
Id. (quoting Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(2)). Thus, the Fran 
court concluded that although courts must take into 
account the obligations to pay section 7501 trust fund 
taxes in their determination of reasonable cause, their 
analysis must not stop there. Id. Accordingly, the court 
held: 
 
       We recognize that it will be the rare case where the 
       government is made the "unwilling partner in a 
       floundering business" . . . without the employer 
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       incurring the duty to pay a penalty for having made 
       such a choice, but it nonetheless remains for the court 
       in each case to weigh all of the factors identified in the 
       Regulations. To hold otherwise would effectively read 
       out of the statute the "reasonable cause" exception to 
       mandatory penalties in many employment tax cases. 
 
Id. 
 
We believe that the decision of the court of appeals in 
Fran is the better reasoned approach since it gives meaning 
to sections 6651 and 6656 of the Code and the regulations 
interpreting them. Brewery forecloses consideration of the 
facts and circumstances of the taxpayers' financial 
situation in contravention of the clear language of Treas. 
Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1). Thus, we conclude that the District 
Court erred as a matter of law in applying the bright line 
rule in Brewery. 
 
B. 
 
Having concluded that the test applied by the Second 
Circuit in Fran is the proper standard for evaluating 
reasonable cause, we now turn to the second issue 
presented -- whether, under the facts and circumstances 
here, the Taxpayers' failure to pay and deposit their 
employment taxes timely was due to reasonable cause and 
not willful neglect. If the evidence establishes that the 
Taxpayers exercised ordinary business care and prudence 
and that they would have suffered undue hardship if they 
would have paid the taxes when due, then reasonable 
cause will exist for the Taxpayers' failure to pay the tax 
timely. The Taxpayers will not be entitled to abatement of 
the penalties, however, if the delinquent payment was due 
to willful neglect. As a preliminary matter, therefore, we will 
address whether the Taxpayers' failure to pay the 
employment taxes timely was due to willful neglect. 
 
The Government urges us to rule that any taxpayer who 
consciously chooses to pay other creditors over the IRS will 
have intentionally and willfully neglected to pay its 
employment taxes. At oral argument, the Government 
conceded that the only instance where nonpayment of trust 
fund taxes would not constitute willful neglect would be 
 
                                16 
  
where the nonpayment results through no fault of the 
taxpayer, or, in other words, is caused by some act of 
nature or other act beyond the taxpayer's control. Here, the 
Government contends, the Taxpayers created their financial 
predicament by participating in the bribery scheme. 
Because such activity is not devoid of fault, the 
Government argues, the nonpayment of taxes constitutes 
willful neglect. In support of its position, the Government 
relies on Boyle, which equated willful neglect with an 
absence of fault. 469 U.S. at 246 n. 4.8  
 
If we were to endorse the Government's position, 
however, we would have to ignore the plain language of 
6651 and 6656, as well as the interpreting regulations. The 
regulations clearly anticipate that a taxpayer will be forced 
to decide during times of financial distress how to 
distribute any available cash. Indeed, the regulations direct 
the courts to inquire as to the amount and nature of the 
taxpayer's expenditures in light of the income (or other 
amounts) it could reasonably expect to receive prior to the 
tax payment due date. Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1). 
 
We are not convinced the Taxpayers' failure to pay trust 
fund taxes under the circumstances here amounted to 
willful neglect. Although the Taxpayers are not entirely 
innocent, their financial viability and cash flow was entirely 
dependent on the government contracts and the corrupt 
employees of the Defense Agencies. Thus, the Taxpayers' 
ability to pay its debts, including trust fund taxes, was 
controlled by the Defense Agencies. Indeed, the 
circumstances suggest that the Government was not an 
unwilling partner in a floundering business, but an active 
participant. Moreover, the deposition testimonies of Roger 
Mooney and D'Antonio indicated that the Taxpayers chose 
to pay only those creditors whose services were essential to 
maintaining and reworking the inventory. Both testified 
that maintaining minimal business operations was required 
to institute adversary proceedings against the Defense 
Agencies and collect the $2.1 million settlement. Without 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The question to be resolved in Boyle was whether under section 
6651(a)(1) the taxpayer's reliance on an attorney to file an estate tax 
return timely was reasonable cause for the failure to meet the deadline. 
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the settlement, sufficient funds would not have existed to 
pay the delinquent trust fund taxes. D'Antonio further 
testified that he felt he had no choice but to pay employees 
from the funds received under government contracts 
because Delaware law makes it a criminal violation not to 
pay employees for time worked. 
 
Although we recognize the need for stringent standards 
where trust fund taxes are involved, we cannot ignore the 
negative impact the Government's position has on public 
policy. The IRS has consistently taken the position that if a 
taxpayer cannot afford to pay trust fund taxes, no matter 
what the cause, it should close up shop. Both the economy 
and the federal fisc are negatively impacted by such an 
approach -- the amount of money flowing into the economy 
and the fisc is reduced as a result of increased 
unemployment, idle buildings and plants, and decreased 
sales of goods and services. Under this approach, no one 
benefits. Where, however, a taxpayer keeps its business 
operating at a minimal level in order to collect monies 
contractually due so that it can pay trust fund taxes and 
other debts, and does in fact collect the funds owed and 
pays its back taxes and other debts, the economy and 
federal fisc, including the IRS, benefit. 
 
We cannot say, therefore, that under these circumstances 
choosing to pay those creditors, whose services were 
essential to maintaining and reworking the inventory, over 
the trust fund taxes constituted a conscious, intentional 
failure or reckless indifference. For this reason, we find that 
the Taxpayers' failure to pay trust fund taxes timely did not 
amount to willful neglect. 
 
Having found that the Taxpayers' delinquency was not 
due to willful neglect, we must now determine whether 
reasonable cause existed for the untimely payment and 
deposit of employment taxes. Reasonable cause will exist if 
the taxpayer establishes that (1) it exercised ordinary 
business care and prudence, and (2) that undue hardship 
would have resulted if it paid the tax liability when it 
became due. Because our discussion of the undue hardship 
requirement will not detain us long, we will turn to that 
element first. 
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The Taxpayers make a persuasive argument in support of 
their position that they have established that payment of 
the taxes when due would have resulted in undue 
hardship. This position is supported by the following facts: 
(1) Mr. and Mrs. D'Antonio incurred substantial personal 
debts by obtaining loans and a mortgage on their residence 
in order to provide additional cash for the taxpayers to stay 
in business; (2) the personal funds were used to pay 
essential creditors and a small number of employees 
retained to re-work the inventory; (3) rent was not paid; (4) 
without the reduced staff, the Taxpayers would have to had 
shut down their operation; (5) the Taxpayers needed to stay 
in business so that they could collect on their claims 
against the government and obtain the funds needed to pay 
the IRS and other creditors. The evidence shows that if the 
Taxpayers had paid their employment taxes when due, they 
would have had insufficient funds to pay the reduced work 
force and essential creditors to enable them to remain a 
going concern. Moreover, the only markets for the $750,000 
of inventory in the Taxpayer's warehouse were the Defense 
Agencies. The Taxpayers have clearly shown that they were 
at the mercy of the Defense Agencies as to whether they 
would have sufficient cash flow to operate the business. 
Under these facts and circumstances, we find that the 
Taxpayers have established that undue hardship would 
have resulted if they had paid their employment taxes on 
time. 
 
Having concluded that the Taxpayers have satisfied the 
undue hardship requirement, we now turn to a 
consideration of whether the Taxpayers exercised ordinary 
business care and prudence under the facts and 
circumstances here. The District Court focused almost 
exclusively on the undue hardship requirement of 
reasonable cause and, having found that financial 
difficulties alone can never constitute reasonable cause, 
determined that there was no reason for it to consider 
whether the Taxpayers had met the other requirement of 
establishing reasonable cause -- ordinary business care 
and prudence.9 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The District Court commented in a footnote, however, that had it 
considered all the facts and circumstances surrounding the non- 
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In determining whether the Taxpayers exercised ordinary 
business care and prudence, we must consider all the facts 
and circumstances bearing on its financial situation.10 The 
record before the District Court contains substantial 
evidence that the Taxpayers exercised ordinary business 
care and prudence. In particular, the evidence shows that 
the Taxpayers did not incur any lavish or extravagant living 
expenses which caused the remainder of its assets and 
income to be insufficient to pay taxes. This conclusion is 
supported by the following evidence: 
 
       1. Any income received by Taxpayers on government 
       contracts was used to pay either taxes owed to the 
       IRS or employees' wages. 
 
       2. Consequently, the Taxpayers did not pay suppliers, 
       rent, health and welfare premiums, employees' 
       union dues, and workers' compensation insurance 
       premiums. 
 
       3. Utility companies were only paid from D'Antonio's 
       personal funds at the eleventh hour after the 
       companies threatened to shut off service. 
 
       4. Suppliers were not paid any amounts owed from 
       1982-1986. Ultimately the Taxpayers owed 
       approximately $7 million to their suppliers. 
       D'Antonio had to personally guarantee payment to 
       the suppliers so that they would continue providing 
       suppliers without payments. As a result, D'Antonio 
       was sued and several liens were placed against his 
       personal assets. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
payment of the employment taxes, it would have reached the same 
conclusion. East Wind Industries, 33 F.Supp.2d at 346 n.6. The only 
factor that the District Court appears to have considered, however, is the 
Taxpayers' participation in the bribery scheme. 
 
10. The dissent implies that we have construed Treas. Reg. S 301.6651- 
1(c)(1) to create a general "ordinary business care and prudence" 
standard for judging how a taxpayer has conducted its business. We do 
not intend to create such a general standard in applying the regulation 
to the Taxpayers' case. Rather, we have evaluated whether the Taxpayers 
exercised ordinary business care and prudence in providing for payment 
of the trust fund taxes in light of all the facts and circumstances 
bearing 
on their financial situation. 
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       5. D'Antonio secured a mortgage on his personal 
       residence and sold several personal assets to 
       obtain cash to pay creditors. In return, D'Antonio 
       accepted several notes from the Taxpayers which 
       became worthless. 
 
       6. The Taxpayers' bookkeeper lent $65,000 of her 
       personal funds to Taxpayers to pay creditors after 
       D'Antonio's personal funds were depleted. 
 
None of these actions reveals any spendthrift tendencies on 
the part of the Taxpayers. 
 
Moreover, D'Antonio sought the advice of professional 
consultants on financial and legal matters with regard to 
the bribery scheme and the cash flow problems. He also 
consulted with similarly situated manufacturers to learn 
how they dealt with the bribery demands of the Defense 
Agencies' employees. 
 
D'Antonio testified that he was required to keep the plant 
operating so that the Defense Agencies would pay for the 
inventory. Inspectors from the Defense Agencies visited the 
plant frequently to make sure the work was being 
completed. Even when the Taxpayers were unable to 
procure new government contracts they were required to 
retain a reduced workforce to rework inventory that had 
been unjustifiably and wrongly rejected by the Defense 
Agencies. At the time the Taxpayers filed for bankruptcy, 
inventory worth $750,000 was sitting in the Taxpayers' 
plant. 
 
Finally, the evidence shows, by virtue of the testimonies 
of both D'Antonio and Mooney, that if the Defense Agencies 
had paid the Taxpayers what was owed under the 
contracts, the Taxpayers would have had sufficient funds to 
pay their employment taxes and other debts when due. 
Thus, it appears that the Taxpayers made reasonable 
efforts to conserve sufficient assets in marketable form, by 
maintaining $750,000 of inventory for the Defense 
Agencies, to satisfy their tax liability and, despite such 
efforts, were unable to pay their employment taxes when 
they became due. 
 
Although all of these factors support a finding that the 
Taxpayers exercised ordinary business care and prudence, 
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the Taxpayers' participation in the bribery scheme raises 
some concern. The District Court concluded, as a matter of 
law, that the Taxpayers' course of conduct in initially 
acceding to the demands of the corrupt officials, and later 
refusing to pay when the demands became unrealistic, 
established that the Taxpayers failed to exercise ordinary 
business care and prudence during the periods in question. 
33 F. Supp.2d at 346 n.6. In reaching this conclusion, the 
District Court was influenced by the fact that the Taxpayers 
had a long history of problems with the corrupt employees 
of the Defense Agencies and, therefore, the District Court 
opined that the employees' actions in rejecting goods and 
holding back payments should have been foreseen by the 
Taxpayers (as distinguished from the Navy's refusal to 
comply with the requirements of the Disputes Clause and 
of the Armed Services Procurement Regulations in Glenwal- 
Schmidt, 78-2 U.S.T.C. P 9610, which was not foreseeable). 
East Wind Industries, 33 F. Supp.2d at 346 n.6. The 
District Court also found significant the fact that the 
Taxpayers' delinquencies spanned a period of six years. Id. 
In this appeal, the Government raises the same bases as 
the District Court in support of its argument that the 
Taxpayers failed to exercise ordinary business care and 
prudence. 
 
The Taxpayers counter that the payment of bribes by 
companies doing business with the Defense Agencies was 
considered the ordinary business practice in the industry. 
D'Antonio testified in his deposition that the bribery 
scheme was widespread and the only way to obtain 
government contracts with the Defense Agencies was to 
participate in the bribery scheme. His testimony is borne 
out by the sworn statement of Special Agent Ford of the 
FBI, in which Agent Ford indicated that D'Antonio, in an 
undercover capacity: 
 
       recorded conversations with DPSC contractors who 
       freely admitted to the payments of bribes and illegal 
       gratuities to DPSC and DCAS employees. In most 
       cases, D'ANTONIO travelled outside the Philadelphia 
       metropolitan area to meet with the government 
       contractors. The contractors' admissions widened the 
       investigation and initiated new investigation [sic] of 
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       DPSC contractors and DCAS employees in other FBI 
       Field Offices, DCIS Field Offices and U.S. Attorneys' 
       Offices. 
 
Affidavit of Joseph L. Ford, dated May 13, 1987, at p. 4. 
 
While not directly on point, we held in In re American 
Biomaterials Corp. 954 F.2d 919, 927 (3d Cir. 1992), that 
where the failure to file timely returns, make deposits and 
pay taxes was the result of embezzlement by the company's 
officers, the failure was due to reasonable cause since their 
criminal actions prevented the corporation from fulfilling its 
duties under the Code. Our decision was predicated upon 
our conclusion that the officers acted without apparent 
authority when they committed the embezzlement and the 
corporation could not be vicariously responsible for the 
penalties resulting from the failure to file returns, make 
deposits and pay taxes. Id. At the very least, American 
Biomaterials held that criminal conduct does not 
automatically foreclose a finding of reasonable cause. Thus, 
based on our holding in American Biomaterials, we cannot 
automatically conclude that the Taxpayers' participation in 
the illegal procurement scheme warrants a finding that they 
failed to exercise ordinary business care and prudence. 
 
Moreover, we are not persuaded by the Government's 
arguments that the facts established that the Taxpayers did 
not exercise ordinary business care and prudence. With 
regard to the Taxpayers' six-year history with corrupt 
officials, we must consider this period in the proper 
context. The delinquency began in 1982, sometime after the 
Taxpayers refused to pay the bribes. The Taxpayers 
attempted to put a stop to the bribery scheme beginning in 
1983 when they contacted the legal staff at the Defense 
Department, and again in 1984, when they contacted other 
authorities. The Taxpayers filed a bankruptcy petition in 
1984, and the FBI began its investigation later that same 
year. The Taxpayers eventually paid off their delinquent 
employment taxes, plus penalties and interest after the 
Bankruptcy Court enforced the Taxpayers' claims against 
the Defense Agencies, resulting in the $2.1 million 
settlement in 1991. 
 
The Government also contends the Defense Agencies' 
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refusal to pay on the contracts and unjustified rejection of 
goods was foreseeable to the Taxpayers. Essentially, the 
Government contends that because the Taxpayers 
participated in the bribery scheme, they should have 
foreseen the consequences. We disagree that these actions 
were necessarily foreseeable. The bribery scheme started in 
1976 and consisted of requests for minor favors and 
gratuities, which the Taxpayers apparently provided. The 
Taxpayers did not start to experience financial difficulties, 
however, until 1982.11 In light of these facts, we do not 
believe the Taxpayers could have anticipated that providing 
minor favors and gratuities to the corrupt employees would 
eventually result in the financial ruin of their business. 
 
Although the Taxpayers' participation in the bribery 
scheme presents a close question, we nonetheless conclude 
that in light of all the facts and circumstances, the 
Taxpayers exercised ordinary business care and prudence. 
The parties should not read our decision as condoning the 
Taxpayers' conduct. We do not. We believe, however, that 
the Taxpayers have made a substantial attempt at righting 
their wrongdoing -- D'Antonio entered guilty pleas to two 
counts of violating 18 U.S.C. S 287, the False Claims 
statute, and he assisted the FBI in obtaining sufficient 
evidence of criminal activity to indict the corrupt officials 
and in bringing a stop to the bribery scheme. Moreover, the 
Taxpayers paid the ultimate price -- financial ruin of their 
business. 
 
In reality, the illegal conduct of the corrupt employees of 
the Defense Agencies, after the Taxpayers refused to accede 
to the bribery demands, caused the financial distress which 
resulted in the Taxpayers' inability to pay its employment 
taxes timely. By its actions, the Government, through the 
Defense Agencies, became a willing partner in afloundering 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. It appears that the Taxpayers' cash flow problems began after the 
bribery demands took on a new dimension -- demands for cash 
payments approximating 50 percent of the profits from the Taxpayers' 
business. When the Taxpayers refused to pay the demands for cash 
payments, the corrupt employees of the Defense Agencies refused to pay 
on the government procurement contracts and unjustifiably rejected the 
Taxpayers' goods. Consequently, inventory began to accumulate, cash 
flow was severely reduced, and new contracts were not forthcoming. 
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business. Therefore, this case presents that rare situation 
described in Fran, supra, where the Taxpayers should be 
relieved of the penalty for failing to pay and deposit their 
employment taxes when due. 164 F.3d at 819. 
 
We therefore hold that because the Taxpayers exercised 
ordinary business care and prudence and would have 
suffered undue financial hardship if they would have paid 
their taxes when due, the nonpayment of trust fund taxes 
was due to reasonable cause and not willful neglect. 
Accordingly, the Taxpayers are entitled to an abatement of 
the penalties. 
 
III. 
 
For the reasons set forth above, we will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court and enter judgment for the 
Taxpayers. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, Dissenting: 
 
This is one of those proverbial "hard" cases that makes 
"bad" law. The Taxpayers have apparently been grievously 
wronged by corrupt government officials. If that be the 
case, the Taxpayers should be entitled to recover 
compensation from the wrongdoers for all the losses that 
they have suffered, including, perhaps, tax penalties that 
would not have been incurred but for the wrongdoers' 
actions. But the Taxpayers' entitlement to compensation is 
not the issue before us. Rather, we must decide whether 
the Taxpayers' failure to pay trust fund taxes from 1982 
through 1988 was due to "reasonable cause" and not to 
"willful neglect" within the meaning of IRCSS 6651 and 
6656. 
 
I agree with the Court that financial difficulties can and 
must be considered in determining whether a taxpayer is 
entitled to a refund of penalties under IRC #8E8E # 6651 and 
6656. I do not agree, however, that consideration of the 
financial difficulties experienced by the Taxpayers in this 
case demonstrates that they are entitled under Treasury 
Regulation S 301.6651-1(c)(1) to the relief that they seek. 
 
Section 301.6651-1(c)(1) of the Regulations provides 
examples of situations in which "reasonable cause" for non- 
payment exists and situations in which it does not exist. As 
the Court notes, the regulation provides, in part, that "a 
failure to pay will be considered to be due to reasonable 
cause to the extent that the taxpayer has made a 
satisfactory showing that he exercised ordinary business 
care and prudence in providing for payment of his tax 
liability and was nevertheless either unable to pay the tax 
or would suffer an undue hardship . . . if he paid on the 
date due." Treas. Reg. S 301.6651-1(c)(1). This provision 
and the remainder of the section make it clear that: (1) 
"reasonable cause" will exist where the taxpayer has made 
a good faith effort to set aside the resources necessary for 
the satisfaction of its tax liability but cannot pay when the 
due date arrives because of unanticipated events beyond its 
control; and (2) "reasonable cause" will not exist where a 
taxpayer fails to husband its resources so that the requisite 
funds will be available for payment when the tax is due, 
e.g., when "a taxpayer . . . incurs lavish or extravagant 
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living expenses in an amount such that the remainder of 
his assets and anticipated income will be insufficient to pay 
his tax." Id. 
 
Contrary to the Court's suggestion, S 301.6651-1(c)(1) 
does not create a general "ordinary business care and 
prudence" standard for judging how a taxpayer has 
conducted its business. It speaks solely to situations in 
which the taxpayer has (or has not) "exercised ordinary 
business care and prudence in providing for payment of his 
tax liability," only to have his efforts thereafter frustrated by 
unanticipated events beyond his control. Id. (emphasis 
added). Accordingly, S 301.6651-1(c)(1) provides no relief for 
a taxpayer who makes a deliberate decision to continue in 
business with no reasonable expectation that it will have 
the resources to satisfy its tax liability when due. 
 
The record in this case strongly suggests that the 
Taxpayers made a deliberate decision (or series of deliberate 
decisions) to continue in business for most, if not all, of the 
period from 1982 to 1988 without making any provision for 
the payment of trust fund taxes and without any 
reasonable expectation that funds would be available to pay 
them when they were due. I would remand this case to the 
District Court for further proceedings and factfinding. 
While I think it unlikely that the Taxpayers will be able to 
establish that their failures to pay were due to"reasonable 
cause" and not "willful neglect," it is not inconceivable to 
me that they will be able to make such a showing for at 
least some portion of the period in question.1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The most likely candidate would seem to me to be the period from 
early 1985 through a portion of 1986 during which the FBI was directing 
Mr. D'Antonio's undercover activities. Since continuing in business 
would appear to be a necessary predicate for such activities, it may be 
that there was "reasonable cause" for the failure to pay and no "willful 
neglect" during this period. In this regard, I note that S 301.6651 of the 
Regulations does not purport to be an exclusive list of situations in 
which a failure to pay is due to "reasonable cause" and not "willful 
neglect" under IRC SS 6651 and 6656. 
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